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Abstract
In this Essay, I first briefly present theoretical contexts that may aid in defining the North Korean legal system. Next, I trace the evolution of the North Korean legal system by examining the
North Korean reaction to various legal influences of the Japanese occupation, Soviet tutelage, and
traditional Korean practices, and outline the current politico-legal structure. In the final section, I
inquire whether the North Korean legal structure can accommodate a different legal system necessitating rule-of-law requirements, as applied to its foreign investment regime and, perhaps some
day, nationwide. Although the main purpose of this Essay is to introduce the North Korean legal
system to the unacquainted, I posit further that the legal system cannot inherently process rule-oflaw syntax, so that any eventual interface will begin to corrode the North Korean legal system as
we know it today.
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THE EVOLUTION AND CHALLENGES OF
THE NORTH KOREAN LEGAL SYSTEM
Patricia Goedde*
I. INTRODUCTION
Analyzing the North Korean legal system is no popular endeavor. Despite the occasional article addressing North Korean
nuclear proliferation issues or the laws of North Korean special
economic zones, there are few comprehensive research pieces
on the North Korean legal system. This void can be attributed to
both practical and theoretical considerations. Practically, researching legal aspects of North Korea ("Democratic People's
Republic of Korea" or "DPRK") is tricky due to the lack of easy
access to the country and to primary materials, thus inhibiting
in-depth case studies. However, one can use North Korean legal
texts, social science journal articles, history monographs, intelligence reports, eyewitness testimonies, personal visits, and even
anecdotal evidence to obtain a fairly comprehensive picture of
the North Korean legal systems. Once practical considerations
are overcome, the fundamental theoretical question remains:
Does law matter in North Korea?
The relative marginalization of law by the North Korean
leadership is what discounts its value abroad. Thus, it would be
tempting to say that employing a legal framework to deduce valuable information about North Korea would be futile. However,
I contend that we can derive great utility by analyzing North Korea from a legal standpoint. First, our ignorance demands it.
Most Americans' knowledge of North Korea does not reach appreciably beyond news headlines, leaving us contemplating a car* Ph.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law; J.D., M.A. in Korean
Studies, University of Washington; B.S., Political Science, Santa Clara University. Ms.
Goedde, an attorney licensed in Washington State, visited the DPRK in 1996, and
worked with the law firm of Kwangjang (now Lee & Ko) in Seoul, Korea. The author
wishes to thank Per Bergling for his insightful advice during the writing of this Essay,
and welcomes comments at pgoedde@hanmail.net.
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icature (i.e., its leadership is willing to barter and develop weapons of mass destruction while its population starves). A legal
analysis compels a more critical appraisal. This framework helps
us to explore the historical rationale behind North Korean domestic and foreign policies and to investigate the workings of the
current politico-legal structure. Second, North Korea is at a
crossroads, presented with a collision of two legal paradigms,
rule-by-law versus rule-of-law, on a number of fronts - political,
economic, and social.
Rather than be satisfied with a "we're right, they're wrong"
position, we must seek a communication between two fundamentally different approaches. For example, there is the question of how to reconcile a socialist legal system with a separate
legal regime reserved for foreign investment in North Korea's
special economic zones. With tectonic shifts in North Korean
economic policy underway, we must also anticipate where North
Korea is headed in terms of a market economy and the legal
changes and challenges accompanying such a transition.
In this Essay, I first briefly present theoretical contexts that
may aid in defining the North Korean legal system. Next, I trace
the evolution of the North Korean legal system by examining the
North Korean reaction to various legal influences of the Japanese occupation, Soviet tutelage, and traditional Korean practices, and outline the current politico-legal structure. In the final section, I inquire whether the North Korean legal structure
can accommodate a different legal system necessitating rule-oflaw requirements, as applied to its foreign investment regime
and, perhaps some day, nationwide. Although the main purpose
of this Essay is to introduce the North Korean legal system to the
unacquainted, I posit further that the legal system cannot inherently process rule-of-law syntax, so that any eventual interface
will begin to corrode the North Korean legal system as we know
it today.
II. DEFINING THE DPRK LEGAL SYSTEM
How does one define the North Korean legal system? Popular media portrays North Korea as a totalitarian State led by a
bizarre, calculating dictator, Kim Jong I1. It would be easy to
dismiss North Korea as having no law under the assumption that
anything outside the conceptual construct of "rule-of-law" is sim-
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ply not "real" law. However, this assumes that rule-of-law itself is
an ideal archetype, when in fact its definition is very fluid. The
core, basic elements of rule-of-law are commonly identified as
accessibility, clarity, and equal applicability to citizens and government officials alike.' In the liberal democratic sense, the definition usually expands to include the right to a fair trial, an independent judiciary, and the presumption of innocence until
proven guilty. It can extend further to include the right to trial
by jury, separation of powers and a durable constitution. Essentially, rule-of-law is an accordion-like concept, but at this point it
would be safe to say that the North Korean legal system does not
have any of the above features.
For the classical comparative law scholar, perhaps the most
convenient placement for North Korea would be within the family of socialist law. The rough definition would then be that the
North Korean legal system lies squarely within the socialist legal
tradition, and thus rule-by-law, not rule-of-law, would be the governing paradigm. Other legal comparativists have questioned,
however, whether socialist law and rule-of-law automatically constitute an oxymoron. Government officials and scholars of the
People's Republic of China and Vietnam also wrestle intensely
with this issue, claiming movement towards a "socialist rule-oflaw."
In his study on China, Randall Peerenboom provides a thin
version of the rule-of-law, resting on procedural requirements
like transparency, fairness, consistency, enforceability, and acceptability by the public. 2 Expanding on thick theories of ruleof-law circulating in China, he categorizes them into four types
(Liberal Democratic, Communitarian, Neo-authoritarian, and
Statist Socialist), while rule-by-law hangs in a category all by itself. Peerenboom does not address variations of rule-by-law in
any detail, but under his criteria, North Korea would fall under
the socialist rule-by-law heading owing to the following traits: totalitarianism, single party rule, no civil society, socialist conception of rights as bourgeois, emphasis on duties to State, law as a
tool of State interest, party policy preceding laws, and lawyers as
1. See Thomas Carothers, Rule of Law Revival, 77(2) FOREIGN AFF. 2 (1998).
2. See RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 65
(2002).
3. See id. at 71-75, 103-09.
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State workers. This is partially helpful in understanding the socialist legal tradition of the North Korean legal system, but it
does little to enlighten us as to what is uniquely North Korean
about the legal structure.
For another perspective, we turn to Ugo Mattei who argues
for an altogether new taxonomy of law, recognizing that "[1] egal
systems are the result of a layered complexity that stems from the
accidents of legal history and from legal transplants."4 Opposed
to the increasingly outmoded Euro-American centric classification of legal families into civil, common, socialist, and "other"
(accounting for variations among the former), Mattei proposes a
new labeling of legal systems: rule of professional law (the Western legal tradition), rule of political law (the law of development
and transition), and rule of traditional law ("Oriental View of
the Law"). Allowing for sub-families and mixed systems, Mattei
locates North Korea within the rule of traditional law with tendencies towards rule of political law, further ensconced in the
"Chinese-style Far Eastern" sub-system.5 Although his taxonomy
is helpful because it reminds us to take into account the various
layers of native, colonial, and communist legal components in
North Korean history, Mattei's categorization of North Korea is
debatable because it fails to identify what is novel about the
North Korean legal system.
At its core, the North Korean legal system is based on socialist law. As we will see, law is a derivative of North Korean party
policy, a means to implement State objectives, a party code that
citizens should follow, and a ruthless mechanism by which to
punish those that do not. At the same time, we should be sensitive to what is distinctively North Korean about the legal system
and explore these intricacies next.
III. EVOLUTION OF THE DPRK LEGAL SYSTEM
Many forces shaped the legal character of the North Korean
State before its birth in 1953: Japanese colonialism, Soviet auspices, and to some extent, the traditional Korean legal code.
The Japanese dominated the legal structure in Korea during the
colonial period of 1910-1945 primarily through laws, Japanese or
4. Ugo Mattei, Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World's Legal Systems, 45 AM. J. COMp. L. 5, 13-14 (Winter 1997).
5. Id. at 42.

2004]

LAW "OF OUR OWN STYLE"

1269

Japanese-trained jurists, and police surveillance. Although Japan
was successful in exerting pervasive control over the Korean population via law and police power, it did not impose Japanese law
completely. Much of the Korean legal system was still kept in
place on matters that Japanese ordinances did not reach, especially concerning anything outside maintaining the public order
(e.g., kinship or succession). 6
Upon liberation of Korea in 1945, the North Korean leadership abrogated all existing Japanese laws but had to reinstate the
same laws to maintain public order until new laws could be
promulgated.7 Meanwhile, the North Korean regime was intent
on purging Japanese colonial practices, including those implemented judicially, which meant removing most legal professionals. Because they were viewed as "pro-Japanese national traitors,"judges, lawyers, and police officers had to be ousted.' The
newly established North Korean Justice Bureau, complete with a
Soviet advisor, started offering two-week training courses to replace legal personnel. The Bureau prohibited Japanese or proJapanese personnel from participating while specifically encouraging farmers, laborers, and women to participate. 9 This inevitably led to the hiring of individuals who lacked legal training, but
it also meant the unavoidable retention of some Japanesetrained jurists for their legal expertise.1 0
The new law code of 1946 ended up being "a modified Japanese legal code combined with a Soviet-style judicial system,
along with elements reflecting the nationalistic and mass-based
policies of the emerging North Korean leadership under Kim I1
Sung."1 "Popular participation" and "democratic legal consciousness" were encouraged in the establishment of laws, ajudicial system and police organization, reflecting the anti-imperialist platform of the emerging North Korean regime. In revamping the legal structure, the idea lay more with expelling proJapanese elements, since the existing laws were seen as a tool to
6. See Chulwoo Lee, Modernity, Legality, and Power in Korea UnderJapanese Rule, in
COLONIAL MODERNITY IN KOREA

7.

CHARLES

K.

ARMSTRONG,

(2003).
8. See id. at 198.
9. See id. at 199.
10. See id. at 198-99.
11. Id. at 197.

27 (Gi-Wook Shin & Michael Robinson eds., 1999).
THE NORTH KOREAN REVOLUTION

1945-1950, at 197
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subjugate the Korean population. Ironically, the Japanese colonial practices which the North Korean leadership was so intent
on purging, were, in fact, significantly retained. This was especially true with respect to the surveillance mechanism which
North Korea developed to a far greater extent through
social
12
surveillance.
mutual
and
police,
"thought"
regulation,
Besides Japanese input, Soviet authority is visible in North
Korea's legal architecture. Soviet advisors in North Korea had a
heavy role in drafting the 1948 DPRK Constitution along with
numerous reform laws and ordinances.1 3 As leaders in the Soviet Civil Administration in North Korea, these consultants were
sensitive to North Korean aspirations, using a populist tone and
emphasizing land reform in the Constitution.1 4 Although the
advisors did not implant pure Soviet law in North Korea, North
Korean judicial practice started to follow a Soviet pattern in
terms of court structure and the procuracy. For example, the
courts exercised not only punitive powers but also had the duty
to educate criminals and the public about being faithful to the
law and the party. Also, similar to other Communist States, ordinary citizens began to serve as people's assessors on the bench
alongside the judge.1 5 As for the procuracy, it was streamlined
to be accountable to the Procurator-General instead of to the
local people's committees and the Justice Bureau. 16 The North
Korean Justice Bureau itself was abolished three years after the
Soviet Union dismantled its own Ministry of Justice in 1956.17
Apart from Soviet legal practice, the more notable influence
was in socialist theory. North Korea initially adopted MarxistLeninist principles in the name of socialism. Briefly, MarxistLeninist ideology claims that law is a tool of the ruling bourgeois
class, and that socialist law, an altogether different species of law,
12. Id. at 191-92.
13. See ERIC VAN REE, SOCIALISM IN ONE ZONE 170 (1989); KATHRYN WEATHERSBY,
SOVIET AIMS IN KOREA AND THE ORIGINS OF THE KOREAN WAR, 1945-1950: NEW EVIDENCE
FROM THE RUSSIAN ARCHIVES 17 (Cold War Int'l History Project, Working Paper No. 8,

Woodrow Wilson Int'l Ctr. for Scholars 1993).
14. See ARMSTRONG, supra note 7, at 201.

15. The North Korean Constitution and the Court Organization Law of 1950 require two people's assessors to work alongside a judge on a bench in cases of first instance. See Sung Yoon Cho, The JudicialSystem of North Korea, 11 (2) ASIAN SURVEY 1171
(Dec. 1971).
16. See id. at 1172.
17. See ROBERT A. SCALAPINO & CHONG-SIK LEE, COMMUNISM IN KOREA 813 (1972).
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is the instrument of the proletariat dictatorship. In Joseph Stalin's words:
...whereas the proletarian dictatorship is a dictatorship of
the exploited majority over the exploiting minority . . . the
dictatorship of the proletariat is the legally unlimited dominance of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie, resting on violence, and enjoying the sympathy and support of the toiling
and exploited masses.1 8
Kim I1 Sung liked this version of socialist legality and was loath to
depart from it. A few years after the Soviet presence and the end
of the Korean War in 1953, Kim I1 Sung began to criticize domestic legal reformists who wanted to follow the de-Stalinization
campaign of the Soviet Union in the late 1950s.' 9 Reformists
wanted to prioritize equal application of the law, thereby subordinating party policy, but Kim I1Sung could not tolerate the idea
and purged the rightists from the courts, procuracy and the Korean Workers' Party for being tainted with a bourgeois legal consciousness. 20 Expanding on the socialist version of the role of
law, Kim I1 Sung declared at a national conference for legal
workers in 1958:
...

the law of our country is an important weapon for imple-

menting the policies of our [S]tate. The policies of our
[S] tate are the policies of our Party. It is impossible to enforce the law without knowledge of the political line and policies of our Party ....

Our judicial functionaries are political

workers who implement the policies of our Party and all the
policies of our state. Law cannot exist by itself without definite basis. Being a reflection of policies, law must be subordi-

18. Sergei Aleksandrovich Golunskii & Mikhail Solomonovich Strogovich, The The-

ory of the State and Law, in SOVIET LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 351, 359 (Hugh W. Babb trans.,
1951) (emphasis added) (quotingJOSEPH STALIN, QUESTIONS OF LENINISM 29-30 (11th
Russian ed. n.d.).
19. See Cho, supra note 15, at 1179.
20. See Hiroshi Oda, The Procuracy and the Regular Courts as Enforcers of the Constitutional Rule of Law: The Experience of East Asian States, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1339, 1353-54
(1987). A similar eradication was taking place at the same time in the People's Republic of China. The Anti-Rightist Movement of 1957 called for a formal rejection of the
concept of the rule of law as "bourgeois" and the leadership expelled advocates for
trying to "use the law to resist the Party." See also Albert H.Y. Chen, Toward a Legal
Enlightenment: Discussion in Contemporary China on the Rule of Law, 17 UCLA PAC. BASIN
L.J. 125, 125-26 (Fall 1999/Spring 2000).
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21
nated to policies and must not be divorced from them.

Under socialist law, State coercion is legitimized. 2 2 Soviet legal
philosophers include this component in their definition of law
as:
the aggregate of the rules of conduct (norms) established or
approved (sanctioned) by [S]tate authority, expressing the
will of the dominant class, as to which the coercive force of the
[S]tate guarantees their begin put into operation to the end of
safeguarding, making secure, and developing social relationships and arrangements agreeable and advantageous to the dominant class.2 3

Furthermore, "law is not above the [S] tate but emanates from it,
and socialist legality, likewise, is always the modus operandi of
the socialist [S]tate and cannot become an impediment to its
realization of its historical tasks."2 4 Therefore, Kim II Sung's
statements of law as weapon and the primacy of policy over law
both reflect Marxist-Leninist application of law where the State
formulates law as an extension of party policy and is authorized
to use coercive force in implementing policy. In some sense, the
DPRK legal system may appear frozen in time, since it still embodies Stalinist-era and colonial practices of yesteryear. The socialist legal tradition has remained strong, but on the other
hand, a distinct Koreanization 2 5 of Marxist-Leninist ideology has
taken place.
Although Marxism-Leninism was the primary doctrine for
North Korean State and society, this changed formally in 1972
when Juche philosophy, "a creative application of Marxist-Leninism to our own country's reality,"26 was introduced in the Consti-

tution. Already in the 1960s, North Korea talked of juche socialism as "socialism of our style" [urisik sahoejuui] .27 Juche cannot
be overstated here due to its importance in North Korean society. It is often translated simply as self-reliance or self-determi21. Cho, supra note 15, at 1180 (1965) (quoting

KIM IL SUNG,

I SELECTED WORKS

384).
22. See Golunskii & Strogovich, supra note 18, at 361.
23. Id. at 370 (emphasis added).
24. Id. at 393.
25. I use this term in the same manner as "Sinification" is used to discuss Chinese
absorption and adjustment of Soviet law.
26. SOCIALIST CONSTITUTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA art.
4 (1972) [hereinafter DPRK CONSTITUTION].
27. ARMSTRONG, supra note 7, at 190.
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nation, but the definition is more complex. Kim I1Sung was
credited with using the term frequently during his guerrilla days,
but he progressively developed juche into a nationalist ideology,
eventually resting it on three pillars: political sovereignty, an independent economy and military self-defense. Not limited to
the political and economic spheres, juche philosophy pervades
all aspects of North Korean society. Essentially, it is a nationalist,
and, I dare say, spiritual creed that requires putting North Korea
first in every respect.2 8 Meanwhile, other unique modifications
to the DPRK Constitution include references to native creations
like the Chongsanri spirit, Chollima Movement, and the Taean
work method.2 9 Finally, in 1992, reference to Marxism-Leninism
in the DPRK Constitution was abandoned altogether. The Constitution has addressed socialist legality consistently, but it has
assumed a local character under juche principle. The current
constitutional article related to law specifies:
The law of the DPRK reflects the wishes and interests of the
working people and is a basic instrument for State administration.
Respect for the law and its strict adherence and execution is
the duty of all institutions, enterprises, organizations and citizens.
of socialist law and promote
The State shall perfect the system
30
the socialist law-abiding life.
This provision expresses five major points with respect to the
North Korean constitutional meaning of law. First, the law reflects the wishes and interests of the working people (the dominant class). Second, the law is a State instrument. Third, citi28. See BRUCE CUMINGS, KOREA'S PLACE IN THE SUN: A MODERN HISTORY 403-04
(1997).

For an official exposition ofjuche ideology, see KIM, JONG IL, ON PRESERVING

THE JUCHE CHARACTER AND NATIONAL CHARACTER OF THE REVOLUTION AND CONSTRUCTION (1997).

29. The Chongsanri spirit and method, as defined by Article 13 of the current
DPRK Constitution, is that "by which superiors assist their subordinates, mix with the
masses to find solutions to problems, and rouse them to conscious enthusiasm preferentially through political work with people." The Chollima [Flying Horse] Movement
refers to the acceleration of socialist construction, while the Taean work method places
all economic management under Party committee leadership, emphasizes greater
politicization of work and promotes better communication between management and

laborers. See Chin Kim, Recent Developments in the Constitutions of Asian Marxist-Socialist
States, 13 CASE W. RES.J. INT'L L. 483, 492-93 (1981).
30. DPRK CONSTITUTION art. 18.

1274

FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 27:1265

zens and all organizations have the duty to obey the law (as opposed to having legal rights against the State). Fourth, socialist
law shall be perfected (eschewing bourgeois law), and, lastly, socialist law-abiding life shall be promoted (making the observance
of law a moral obligation). The dominant theme is socialist, but
Kim I1 Sung invented the concept of "socialist law-abiding life,"
to be instilled in everyone via mass campaigns promoting respect
for public authority and the duty to obey all the legal norms and
rules issued by the State,3 1 effectively merging politics, law, and
morality into one concept.
Besides the later reference points of juche and "Kimilsungism" (a take-off from "Stalinism"), strands of traditional Korean
legal history underlie the North Korean legal system in subtle
but enduring ways. Ancestral lineage and worship, as defined by
patrilineal descent was a core concept of Neo-Confucian ideology during Choson Dynasty (1392-1910) and codified in the Kyongguk Taejon [Great Code of Governance] of 1471.32 This principle has remained in North Korean society in terms of dynastic
succession and inheritance of family class status, where the distinction between the yangban [elite] and commoners was strong.
However, the Korean Workers' Party ("KWP") replaced the
yangban as the elite core of society and one's political status in or
outside the KWP circle continues with the family name. Because
this class ranking stays with a North Korean for life and passes to
his or her descendants, those in a politically dangerous class inherit a lifetime of general or strict surveillance. Another example of patrilineal importance is Kim Jong Il's official assumption
of power three years after his father's death. The exact reason
for this is unconfirmed, but had Kim Jong I1 assumed power
hastily, it would have exhibited greed to rule, insecurity of his
legitimacy, and most importantly, lack of respect for his (and the
nation's) father. It is almost certainly no coincidence that the
Kyongguk Taejon stipulates three years as the mourning period
for the death of one's father. 3
Neo-Confucian impact on North Korean customary and legal practices is important but must not be overemphasized.
31. See SUNG YOON CHo, LAW AND LEGAL
18 (1988).
32. See generally MARTINA DEUCHLER, THE
A STUDY OF SOCIETY AND IDEOLOGY (1992).
33. See id. at 182-83.

LITERATURE OF NORTH KOREA:
CONFUCIAN TRANSFORMATION

A GUIDE
OF KOREA:
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Such traditional elements appear to place the DPRK in Mattei's
"Chinese-style, Far Eastern" box, but no less important are the
Japanese colonial and Soviet legal influences that came later, adjusted by more modern, revolutionary Korean Communist interpretation. Although familial themes of North Korean society are
easily attributable to Confucianism, Bruce Cumings warns that
familial references are not unique to Confucianism. He prefers
calling North Korea a corporatist State, a less culture-specific
term that explains much of the familial themes in North Korean
society.3 4 Cumings has a valid point considering the many Christian metaphors (e.g., Father-Son) also found in North Korea."
This discussion may seem a digression, but we come full circle to
the latest revision of the DPRK Constitution in 1998, which immortalizes Kim I1Sung as the eternal leader of North Korea.
The Constitution is a legal preservation of his sacredness, exemplifying another fusion of law and morality.
IV. POLITICO-LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE DPRK
Before making further reference to the DPRK Constitution,
it is imperative to differentiate this legal text from Western constitutions. While the latter function to regulate governmental
power and guarantee individual rights, the DPRK Constitution
does not have the same priority. Like its Chinese and
Vietnamese counterparts, the DPRK Constitution is a dynamic,
prescriptive document that outlines the institutional apparatus
of the State and delineates the current policy objectives of the
Party.3 6 It marks turning points in the overall progression of the
34. See Bruce Cumings, The CorporateState in North Korea, in STATE AND SOCIETY IN
CONTEMPORARY KOREA 197-230 (Hagen Koo ed., 1993).
35. Kim I1Sung had Protestant parents and a Christian upbringing. Some of the
analogies to Kim I1Sung being seen as a "religious" figure are "giving thanks" to the
Dear Leader before meals in orphanages, the sanctity of his family sites, and the mythical birth of Kim Jong II on Mt. Baekdu, the tallest mountain in Korea.
36. For a sampling of literature on the significance of the PRC Constitution, see
Jerome A. Cohen, China's Changing Constitution, CHINA Q., No. 76, at 794-841 (Dec.
1978); ANDREW J. NATHAN, POLITICAL RIGHTS IN THE CHINESE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION IN CHINESE DEMOCRACY 107-32 (1986); William C. Jones, The Constitution of the People's Republic of China, 63 WASH. U. L.Q. 707-35 (1985);Janet E. Ainsworth, Interpreting
Sacred Texts: Preliminary Reflections on ConstitutionalDiscourse in China, 43 HASTINGS LJ.
273-300 (1992). For a view on the Vietnamese Constitution, see Pip Nicholson,
Vietnamese Legal Institutions in Comparative Perspective: Contemporary Constitutions and
Courts Considered, in LAW, CAPITALISM AND POWER IN ASIA 300 (Kanishka Jayasuriya ed.,
1999).
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country's development. For example, since its inception in
1948, the Constitution was amended in 1972, 1992 and 1998,
with five minor revisions between 1954 and 1962. We should
bear in mind this purpose of the DPRK Constitution withoutjuxtaposing it with the standard of constitutions in Western liberal
democracies. The Constitution cannot be viewed as a permanent, protective covenant of individual rights, but it is a useful
map in charting North Korean policy development.
The DPRK Constitution sets out the basic organization of
the Party apparatus and reflects organizational changes throughout the years. For example, in 1992, the National Defense Commission was made the second highest State organ in a move to
consolidate KimJong Il's power after his father's death. The political structure of the North Korean State, as reflected in the
Constitution, is organized in the following order: the Supreme
People's Assembly ("SPA"), the National Defense Commission
("NDC"), the SPA Presidium, the Cabinet, Local People's Assembly, Local People's Committee, and the Public Procurators' Office and Court. The KWP is the superstructure over all these
institutions. Kim Jong Il is General Secretary of the KWP and
also the Chair of the NDC, the defacto highest State organ in the
DPRK since it prevails over the SPA.37 With candidates prescreened by the KWP before election, the SPA serves more or
less as a rubber-stamping vehicle for the KWP. 38 The same applies to local people's committees whose candidates are also preapproved by the KWP before election. The SPA Presidium actually holds more power than the SPA. Historically, Party officials
of the SPA Presidium held higher ranks than SPA chairmen,3 9
and a reading of the Constitution demonstrates that the SPA
Presidium's prerogatives exceed those of the SPA. For example,
the SPA Presidium convenes SPA sessions, interprets the Constitution and laws, issues decrees, and can create or liquidate Cabinet organizations.4" Meanwhile, the Chair and Vice Chair of the
SPA Presidium hold concurrent positions in the SPA.
The courts and procuracies are accountable to the SPA Presidium or to the SPA in session. The tri-level court system con37. See Dae-kyu Yoon, North Korea, in LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD 1193 (Herbert
M. Kritzer ed., 2000).
38. See id. No record of dissenting votes has been observed in SPA sessions.
39. See SCALAPINO & LEE, supra note 17, at 796-97.
40. DPRK CONSTITUTION art. 110.
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sists of a Central Court, twelve provincial courts and approximately 100 people's courts.4" A separate special court consists of
the military court which covers criminal cases under its jurisdiction. The courts mainly address criminal and divorce cases,
while trials concerning administrative, constitutional, or election
issues are not allowed.42 Lower courts usually have one judge
and two people's assessors, while appeal courts have three
judges. Although, in principle, regional people's assemblies
elect the judges and people's assessors, the KWP appoints all
candidates.4 3 The procuracy structure resembles the court structure, with a Central Procuracy, provincial and county procuracies, and a separate military procuracy. Although procuracies investigate and prosecute crimes, procuracy offices also have the
unique function of auditing other State organs and can try civil,
divorce, and mediation cases uncovered in that administrative
process.4 4 These institutions are dependent on the KWP, since
the SPA Presidium has the authority to elect or transfer Central
Court judges and people's assessors, while the SPA can appoint
or remove the Procurator-General and can elect or transfer the
Chief Justice. 45 The same goes for North Korean lawyers. Numbering somewhere between 500 and 1,000,46 these legal consultants and representatives receive State salaries and are assigned
clients by the local lawyers' committee. Thus, they represent the
interest of the State, rather than the client whom they are expected to educate and persuade to confess.4 7
The courts, procuracy and lawyers do not alone assume the
legal role of educating, disciplining and punishing citizens. Local people's committees, work units, and fellow compatriots have
the same function. In particular, "socialist law-abiding" committees instituted in people's committees at all levels are more powerful legal actors since they oversee the procuracy, police, and
41. YONAP NEws AGENCY, NORTH KOREA HANDBOOK 151 (Monterey Interpretation
and Translation Services trans., 2003) [hereinafter NORTH KOREA ANDBOOK].
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 152.
45. DPRK CONSTITUTION arts. 91, 110.
46. The North Korea Handbook reports that there are 500 lawyers working full or
part-time, while Yoon Daekyu approximates the number to be closer to 1,000. The
exact figure is difficult to pinpoint, especially since non-lawyers can also aid clients. See
NORTH KOREA HANDBOOK, supra note 41, at 152; Yoon, supra note 37, at 1196.
47. Yoon, supra note 37, at 1196.
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State inspection agencies.4 8 Specifically, they check officials'
abuse of power, comment on laws, disseminate legal information, supervise work units and citizens in general, apply legal
sanctions or delegate some of these functions to law-enforcement agencies at their discretion.4 9 For those who want to file
complaints and petitions against any State agency wrongdoings,
an administrative process exists where the relevant socialist lawabiding committee can decide appropriate punitive actions
against officials guilty of any transgression. 5 ° Furthermore, the
concerned agency, enterprise or local party committee can organize a peer tribunal system to handle minor offenses and mete
out punishments like fines, reprimands, or temporary suspensions of salary.5 1
A final comment about the DPRK Constitution concerns its
irrelevance to an entire class of people. The Constitution lists
rights for its citizens, but these rights are unavailable to those
located outside its ideal socialist society. Constitutional rights
extend only to those citizens who correctly abide by the socialist
way of life. That is, rights are only granted to the extent citizens
fulfill their duties to the State. For those who offend the State,
intentionally or not, these rights do not apply and repercussions
are severe. In the post-war period, reactionaries, pro-Japanese,
and former landowners were systematically imprisoned in keeping with the revolutionary nature of the State and the constant
aim of crushing the bourgeois classes. Descendants of these
groups are unable to shed their class backgrounds to this day,
and are constantly subjected to State and peer scrutiny for the
smallest offenses. Labeled as hostile or potentially hostile to the
State, these individuals are the bottom rung of the socialist hierarchy, if not completely outside of it, and thus are not granted
the same privileged rights as the rest of the politically correct
populace unless they can prove otherwise.5 2
Because State force is legitimized under socialist law, arbitrary detention and imprisonment of State criminals, or enemies,
48. Sung Yoon Cho, Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea): The Socialist
Constitution of the DemocraticPeople's Republic of Korea,in CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS IN LATE
TWENTIETH CENTURY ASIA 289-90 (Lawrence Beer ed., 1992).
49. Id.
50. See NORTH KOREA HANDBOOK, supra note 41, at 153.
51. See id.
52. See generally HELEN-LouISE HUNTER, KIM IL-SONG'S NORTH KOREA 3-11 (1999).
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are politically acceptable. The lack of both, the presumption of
innocence and the right to a fair trial, is antithetical to constitutional democracies, but these notions would never apply to
North Korean society in the first place, because the political status of the accused is obviously anti-State, usually pre-determined
by the person's pre-revolutionary family background. Therefore, the DPRK government would deem what we call arbitrary as
logical and justified. Even assuming the accused gets to present
his or her case before a judicial panel, the trial would never be
fully impartial given judicial deference to the KWP. The extreme lack of political rights in the criminal process, from accusation to imprisonment, has been the subject of international
criticism by human rights organizations, but the DPRK government has repeatedly denied any human rights abuses,5 3 consistent with its view that certain classes were never accorded rights
in the first place.
V. LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE DPRK
The DPRK faces major legal challenges internationally with
respect to such areas as human rights protection and compliance with nuclear nonproliferation standards, but the most salient challenge emerges from within, i.e., the economic development of North Korea. In the last decade, the DPRK has established a number of special economic zones in order to induce
foreign capital. In the past two years, it has attempted wide-scale
economic reform. This section addresses a number of questions
that emerge in that context: Are the zones economically sustainable? What legal structures govern their operations? Do these
legal regimes promote or inhibit the economic viability of the
special economic zones? In pursuing nationwide economic reform, will the DPRK follow the examples of China or Vietnam by
initiating a socialist-oriented market economy with concurrent
legal reform?
A. Foreign Investment in Special Economic Zones
With a focus on heavy industry, North Korea had steady economic growth into the 1970s, but began to face difficulty in ser53. Core Document Forming Part of the Reports of the State Parties: Democratic People's
Republic of Korea, U.N. Office of the High Commissionerfor Human Rights, U.N. Doc. HRI/
CORE/I /Add.108/Rev.1 (2002).
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vicing its foreign debt in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Deteriorating economic conditions in the 1980s necessitated another legal transformation in North Korea. Making a number of visits to
the People's Republic of China ("PRC"), Kim I1 Sung studied
Chinese experiments with foreign investment and special economic zones. Soon after, the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly
promulgated the firstJoint Venture Law in 1984, patterned after
China's joint venture law, although not explicitly. However, the
law alone failed to attract foreign investment, and in the wake of
the collapse of the socialist bloc, which severed many trade relationships and cut access to the usual markets, Kim I1 Sung had to
initiate further changes. This led to the creation of the RajinSunbong Free Economic and Trade Zone ("Rajin-Sunbong"),
which was accompanied by a constitutional revision and the passing of foreign investment laws in the 1990s.
The flurry of legal activity surrounding foreign investment
raises two fundamental questions. How can the inducement of
foreign capital not violate juche principle, one of its chief pillars
being economic self-reliance? How can the DPRK leadership
justify this compromise? Furthermore, how can a socialist legal
system accommodate small pocket economies that run on private law principles? Pyongyang leadership saw no specific ideological quandary in reconciling foreign capital input with juche,
or at least it was not about to show that it did. Since economic
survival was at stake, foreign investment was seen as a means to
an end. Furthermore, the State was prepared to guard against
unseemly capitalist influence, for example by exhorting the population to raise a "mosquito net" against polluting bourgeois
thoughts5 4 and by physically barricading special economic zones
to prevent infiltration of capitalist methods into the rest of
North Korean society (and to keep curious, unauthorized North
Koreans out).
Meanwhile, North Korean legal instruments reflect State efforts to resuscitate the economy. Amendments to the Constitution in 1992 specify that foreign investments are permitted in
special economic zones, while the SPA passed various foreign investment laws and regulations in the early and mid-1990s related
to the Rajin-Sunbong Free Economic and Trade Zone (the word
"Free" was later dropped). This raises the other issue of whether
54.

NORTH KOREA HANDBOOK,

supra note 41, at 370-71.
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two different legal templates, one socialist-based and the other
private law-based, can coexist. DPRK leadership believes that
they can, based on China's experience with special economic
zones. The laws on their face appear to provide a liberal foreign
investment environment with incentives such as choice in enterprise type, tax holidays and discounts, guaranteed profit remittance and no customs duties on export and import materials."
A close reading of the laws and regulations, however, reveals
heavy and intrusive State presence despite all references to national ideology being stripped. The extent of State involvement
and requirements (e.g., State brokerage of labor recruitment,
costs to develop leased land, mandatory pay raises, and free
meals for workers) may have surprised those who invested, but
these conditions were all stated as legal provisions from the outset.
Legal infrastructure aside, Rajin-Sunbong has not been particularly successful, attracting only about a fifth of the total of
U.S.$640 million in investments pledged at its much publicized
United Nations-sponsored investment forum in 1996.56 Investors point to its marginal location at the northeastern tip of the
Korean peninsula, lack of transport infrastructure, border-crossing impediments, increasing hidden costs, and administrative intrusion.5 7 Other special economic zones constructed later have
not fared much better. The Mt. Geumgang Tourist Zone has
been the best source of cash for the North Korean government
since 1998, when the South Korean Hyundai conglomerate committed U.S.$942 million over a period of five years to shuttle
South Koreans visitors by ship.5 8 However, the viability of this
project is now in jeopardy because Hyundai is increasingly in the
55. For detailed treatment of these foreign investment laws, see Bryan Greyson et
al., Foreign Investment Laws and Regulations of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 21
FORDHAM INr'L L. J. 1677 (1998); Haksoo Ko, Foreign Investment in North Korea: An Assessment of Recent Laws and Regulations, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 221 (1998); Sang-Jick Yoon,
Critical Issues on the Foreign Investment Laws of North Korea for Foreign Investors, 15 Wis.
INT'L L. J. 325 (1998); Eric Yong-Joong Lee, Developments of North Korea's Legal Regime
GoverningForeign Business Cooperation:A Revisit Under the New Socialist Constitutionof 1998,
21 NW. J. INr'L LAw & Bus. 199 (2000).
56. Bradley Babson, Economic Cooperation on the Korean Peninsula, Northeast
Asia Peace and Security Network Special Report (Mar. 6, 2003), at http://www.nautilus.
org/napsnet/sr/index.html (last modified Mar. 30, 2004).
57. MARCUS NOLAND, AVOIDING THE APOCALYPSE: THE FUTURE OF THE Two KoREAS
136 (2000).
58. Id. at 139.
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red with this venture. Also negotiated between the DPRK and
Hyundai (and the South Korean government) is the Gaesung Industrial Zone located close to the South Korean border. This
industrial complex is currently under construction by Hyundai
Asan and the Korea Land Corporation, and its future is still indeterminate. North Korea's latest attempt at yet another special
zone was in 2002, when it designated Sinuiju, a city on its eastern
Chinese border, as a special administrative region based on the
Hong Kong model. Here, too, progress has stalled because Chinese authorities arrested the designated Dutch-Chinese governor for tax evasion. The DPRK has yet to find a comparable
replacement to spearhead development for Sinuiju.
Each zone has a different legal personality (i.e., economic
and trade zone, tourist zone, industrial complex, and special administrative region) and a different legal structure for foreign
investment, which demonstrates that the DPRK does not have a
cohesive foreign investment legal regime. For example, most of
the foreign investment laws of the 1990s relate to Rajin-Sunbong
and do not apply to the other zones. Both, the Mt. Geumgang
Tourist Zone and the Gaesung Industrial Zone, were specially
negotiated between the DPRK government and Hyundai with the
consent of the South Korean government. Brief decrees governing the legal structures of Mt. Geumgang and Gaesung came
in 2002 and refer to the legal authority of agreements reached
between the North and South with respect to the zones. 59 Meanwhile, Sinuiju is designed to have a separate administrative and
legal structure altogether, as laid out in the Basic Law of the
Sinuiju Special Administrative Region ("Sinuiju Basic Law"). Although it is unknown what legal system will be imported, controls are in place to regulate all activities within the administrative region, such as ultimate accountability of the governor and
legislative council to the central government, SPA Presidium
powers to interpret and amend the Sinuiju Basic Law, the power
59. Decree of Mt. Geumgang Tourist Zone and related regulations. "Agreements
reached between the North and South" presumably refers to the business contracts
negotiated between both sides, as well as the inter-Korean Agreement on Commercial
Dispute Resolution, signed at the ministerial talks in Pyongyang on December 16, 2000.
An English translation of this agreement, as well as of the three bilateral agreements on
investment protection, clearing settlement, and prevention of double taxation of income, can be found under Inter-Korea Relations, Inter-Korean Document, at the ROK
Ministry of Unification website, at http://www.unikorea.go.kr/en/.
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of the legislative council to interpret their own regulations, and
60
the lack of judicial independence in interpreting laws.
Although the DPRK crafted legislation to promote foreign
investment in'special economic precincts, the success of a project depends more on political negotiations and long-term profitability than on a strict reading of the laws. Despite the absence
of any reference to socialism and juche in the foreign investment
laws and regulations, administrative and social controls are
firmly entrenched. The current laws do more to exert control
and provide social and capital benefits to North Korea than to
provide protection and recourse for investors, thereby inhibiting
investments. Perhaps realizing that, the State recently made the
call for foreign lawyers and accountants to work in the DPRK to
help draw foreign investment.6" The DPRK's struggles with
piecemeal legislation for foreign investment zones in its territorial outskirts, raises the question of how it might standardize its
domestic legal regime for national economic reform.
B. Nationwide economic reform
So far, the special economic zones have been largely unproductive vehicles to induce foreign investment and gain hard currency, thereby doing little to alleviate the real crises of poverty,
famine and natural disasters continuously plaguing North Korea.
As for the economy itself, World Bank consultant Bradley Babson writes that it is currently in "a fragile low growth mode, dependent on disbursements of foreign funded projects, humanitarian assistance programs, and Chinese aid and subsidies."6 2
With its economy at rock-bottom, the DPRK government finally
initiated nationwide economic reforms in July 2002. Previous
wariness of the term "reform" disappeared as the SPA (Presidium) Chair Kim Yong Nam proclaimed:
We are reactivating the whole field of the national economy
...We are directing our whole efforts to restructure our eco60. For a translation and explanation of Basic Law of the Sinuiju Special Administrative Region, see Patricia Goedde, The Basic Law of the Sinuiju Special Administrative Region:
A Happy Medium Between the DPRK Constitution and Hong Kong Basic Law?, 3J. OF KOREAN
L. 77 (2003).
61. DPRK in Search of Foreign Lawyers, Accountants, Northeast Asia Peace And
Security Network Daily Report, at http://www.nautilus.org/napsnet/dr/0310/OCT2903.html (Oct. 29, 2003).
62. Babson, supra note 56.
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nomic base to be in line with the information technology
revolution . . . and as we have done since 1945 we are under-

taking reforms in line with the prevailing situation, in the best
interests of the people .

.

. we are reforming
theoeconomic
3

6
system on the principle of profitability.

The DPRK government made major changes such as: (1) increasing the price of rice and other basic commodities purchased through the Public Distribution System to reflect informal market prices; (2) increasing wages; (3) charging higher
rent of households and higher transport fees; (4) allowing State
enterprises to determine their own production plans and engage
in commercial transactions; and (5) devaluing the North Korean
won, while removing the convertible won from the market (similar to China eliminating the Foreign Exchange Certificate in
1994). These actions partially resemble the doi moi (economic
renovation) initiatives of the Vietnamese government in 1986,
but thus far have not improved North Korea's overall economy.
It may be premature to compare North Korea with China
and Vietnam because their economies are at very different stages
of development, but China and Vietnam are North Korea's best
models if it wants to gradually move toward accepting a market
economy without sacrificing socialism. China and Vietnam are
seminal examples of socialist, centrally-planned economies that
have explicitly moved toward operating a socialist market economy with simultaneous moves toward being a law-based State.
The important question is whether North Korea will emulate
China or Vietnam in pursuing a socialist market economy along
with legal reform.
In 1994, the DPRK accused China of being "traitors to the
socialist cause" and probably lumped Vietnam in the same category considering that both formed formal political and economic ties with South Korea. The DPRK has since softened its
language toward China given the latter's economic assistance,
and has shown interest in Vietnam's doi moi policy. The DPRK is
very cautious about limiting foreign investment to specially designated enclaves on its perimeter, but that is how China started
out before implementing economic reforms nationwide. It is
not far-fetched that the DPRK would also like to pursue its own
particular path of economic reform. It probably fears, however,
63. Id.
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that deeper economic reform will open the floodgates to uncontrollable external influences, undermining the juche ideology
upon which the State is based.
China and Vietnam have made conscious policy shifts to embrace a socialist market economy as illustrated by their constitutional amendments. The 1993 PRC Constitution expressly stipulates, "[t]he State practices a socialist market economy," while
the 1992 Vietnamese Constitution reads, " [t] he State promotes a
multi-component commodity economy functioning in accordance with market mechanisms under the management of the
State and following the socialist orientation" to reflect doi moi
policy. 64 Both China and Vietnam also recognize the role of law
in economic development. In 1999, China revised the Constitution to include the phrase "rule of law" (although it may not
comport exactly with the Western liberal definition). The
Vietnamese government significantly amended its Constitution
in 1992 to promote doi moi and planned a ten year Legal Reform
Strategy, acknowledging that legal reform is fundamental to economic reform.65 While the DPRK has made constitutional modifications and enacted laws to accommodate more domestic economic activities and foreign investment, it is difficult to predict
whether the State will opt whole-heartedly for a socialist market
economy. The DPRK is still trying to resuscitate its failed economy under the counterproductive juche principle, and as long as
it clings to a planned economy, it will not budge from its constitutional objective of "perfecting socialist law."
The DPRK will not move toward the rule-of-law, especially
without a more serious economic reform. As it stands, North
Korea cannot successfully implement its current reform package.
To ensure its economic well-being, it will need outside help from
neighbors like South Korea, Japan, China, the United States,
and International Financial Institutions ("IFIs"). Although the
DPRK has inquired about joining IFIs like the World Bank and
the Asian Development Bank ("ADB") and sought assistance
64. PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA CONSTITUTION art. 15 (adopted Dec. 4, 1982,
amended Apr. 12, 1988 and Mar. 29, 1993); SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM CONSTITUTION (adopted Nov. 1946, amended Dec. 31, 1959, Dec. 18, 1980 and Apr. 18, 1992).
65. See Levien Do, Vietnam's Revised Constitution: Impact on Foreign Investment, in VIETNAM AND THE RULE OF LAw (Carlyle Thayer & David Marr eds., 1993). See also Comprehensive Needs Assessment of Vietnam's Legal System Development 2001-2010
(LNA), available at www.vnforum.org/docs/gov/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2004).
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from the International Monetary Fund ("IMF"), it has not had
any success to date. Its poor debt repayment history and antagonistic relations with the United States hinder North Korean participation. The United States has a crucial role in deciding
whether the DPRK can acquire any economic assistance from institutions like the World Bank, ADB, or IMF. By law, the U.S.
government cannot support IFI loan assistance to the DPRK or
provide domestic assistance under the International Financial
Institutions Act or the Foreign Assistance Act, respectively.6 6 Unless North Korea can improve its human rights record and a constructive understanding is reached on the current nuclear impasse, the U.S. government will continue to withhold its support
for financial assistance to the DPRK.
If the United States and the DPRK could negotiate a security package that includes IFI assistance, it would introduce a very
plausible scenario that moves us beyond the conventional "regime change or status quo" attitude circulating in some American policy spheres. In carrying out their reform work, IFIs like
the World Bank and the ADB (and many bilateral aid agencies)
assume a causal connection between rule-of-law and economic
sustainability.6 7 IFI projects would not only include assistance in
terms of money and technology, but also technical expertise in
law and business management. I venture that, on the whole, the
DPRK would be receptive to these types of assistance. Although
accepting such aid might appear to go against juche principle,
juche is an elastic concept. If North Korean theorists can rationalize juche to tolerate special economic zones and the latest nationwide economic reform, they can stretch it further. However,
North Korea is unlikely to find the language of rule-of-law palatable. Ideological language notwithstanding, could the current
North Korean legal system practically absorb what would still essentially be a rule-of-law transplant? As vehicles that export the
rule-of-law, IFIs favor a comprehensive approach, targeting legal
frameworks (substantive and procedural), legal institutions, legal education and legal information.6" In reforming these sec66. See 22 U.S.C.S. § 262d (2004); 22 U.S.C.S. § 2151n (2004).
67. See Asian Development Bank, Law and Policy Reform, at http://www.adb.org/
Law/default.asp (Mar. 8, 2004); The World Bank Group, Legal and Judicial Reform, at
http://www4.worldbank.org/legal/leglr/index-english.html
(last visited Feb. 10,
2004).
68. See, e.g., Developing Mongolia's Legal Framework: A Need Analysis, at http://
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tors in North Korea, challenges would abound across the board
for all parties. IFIs may have relative luck working on foreign
investment-related matters, such as promoting transparency in
accounting procedures, improving fair and consistent dispute
resolution mechanisms, training judges and lawyers on commercial transactions, and disseminating legal information, but they
would hit a wall in areas outside foreign investment. 6 9 Creating
an independent judiciary, devolving power to the people, applying civil liberties fairly - these are all counterintuitive processes
in the Party-conscious hierarchy of North Korea. Ultimately, ideologies would collide, and how much juche can yield is the question. We cannot get too ahead of ourselves in making predictions, but these potential problems must be flagged for what may
come one day.
VI. CONCLUSION
North Korea has a multifaceted legal system that warrants
more than ritual dismissal for not conveniently falling under a
rule-of-law heading. Conceptual constructs such as socialist legality, rule-by-law, or even the "Chinese-style Far Eastern" subsystem are helpful in describing major tendencies of the North
Korean legal structure but do little to define its novelties. Layers
of traditional, colonial, and socialist legal influences have
molded the North Korean legal system, but the most significant
impact comes from the "Koreanization" of law under Kim I1
Sung's juche ideology. Just as North Korea has called its socialism "of our own style," so too is this uniqueness extended to and
reflected in the legal system. Law is but a policy tool of the Korean Workers' Party, by which dutiful citizens must abide. In addition, the law is imbued with juche, Kim I1Song's constitutionalized sacredness, and the Korean revolutionary experience.
The North Korean legal system faces challenges, one current and one forward-looking, mainly by the rule-of-law paradigm. The current predicament concerns the creation of a viable legal regime for foreign investors, one that is reliable, fair,
(Oct.
www.adb.org/Documents/Papers/Mongolia-Legal-Framework/default.asp
1995).
69. For an argument against blanket transfer of a rule-of-law platform, see FRANK
UPHAM, MYTHMAKING IN THE RULE OF LAW ORTHODOXY (Carnegie Endowment for Int'l
Peace, Working Paper No. 30, Sept. 2002), at http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/sites/ceip.
html.
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and transparent, without intrusive State involvement. North Korea has not prioritized the development of an attractive foreign
investment legal regime, calling into question how it may accommodate legal transition to a socialist market economy, should
such a move be attempted in the future. The DPRK can continue to stimulate its economy under juche principles, which so
far has proven unsustainable, or it can opt for gradual, broaderscale economic reform while still retaining socialism. Should it
be the latter, North Korea will likely need assistance from the
IFIs and bilateral aid agencies to pursue concurrent legal reform, and will benefit from studying the experiences of China
and Vietnam. The rule-of-law agenda that many of these aid organizations champion, however, are at odds with the current
North Korean legal system, i.e. they are more in the realm of
civil liberties and less in the area of foreign investment. Rule-oflaw (socialist or not) will not appear in the DPRK without a more
significant economic transition, presumably toward a socialist
market economy, and will not come from purely domestic initiative. The North Korean legal system will be affected by the demands of the rule-of-law paradigm, ultimately dooming North
Korea's law "of our own style."

